Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom
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Publication:645673
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.007zbMath1274.91041WikidataQ114015297 ScholiaQ114015297MaRDI QIDQ645673
Publication date: 10 November 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.03.007
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