On the ordinal equivalence of the Johnston, Banzhaf and Shapley power indices
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Publication:421763
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2011.07.028zbMath1237.91025MaRDI QIDQ421763
Montserrat Pons, Dorota Marciniak, Josep Freixas
Publication date: 14 May 2012
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.07.028
game theory; decision support systems; simple games; power indices; complete simple games; ordinal equivalence
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