Voting power in the governance of the international monetary fund
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Publication:1614153
DOI10.1023/A:1016324824094zbMath1005.91036OpenAlexW2125150859MaRDI QIDQ1614153
Publication date: 3 September 2002
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1016324824094
Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Statistical methods; economic indices and measures (91B82)
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