Heuristic and exact solutions to the inverse power index problem for small voting bodies
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Publication:744673
DOI10.1007/S10479-012-1293-0zbMATH Open1309.91011arXiv1202.6245OpenAlexW2137845619MaRDI QIDQ744673FDOQ744673
Publication date: 26 September 2014
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Power indices are mappings that quantify the influence of the members of a voting body on collective decisions a priori. Their nonlinearity and discontinuity makes it difficult to compute inverse images, i.e., to determine a voting system which induces a power distribution as close as possible to a desired one. This paper considers approximations and exact solutions to this inverse problem for the Penrose-Banzhaf index, which are obtained by enumeration and integer linear programming techniques. They are compared to the results of three simple solution heuristics. The heuristics perform well in absolute terms but can be improved upon very considerably in relative terms. The findings complement known asymptotic results for large voting bodies and may improve termination criteria for local search algorithms.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1202.6245
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