On the inverse problem for a subclass of linear, symmetric and efficient values of cooperative TU games

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2016.07.009zbMath1408.91017OpenAlexW2475229117MaRDI QIDQ1755825

Jony Rojas Rojas, Francisco Sanchez-Sanchez

Publication date: 11 January 2019

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2016.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

inverse problemlinear, symmetric and efficient valuenull space of a linear operator

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule, New Characterizations of the Discounted Shapley Values

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