The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.03.007zbMath1135.91316MaRDI QIDQ2483116

Gerard van der Laan, Adolphus J. J. Talman, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date: 28 April 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/959362/AverTreeSol-GEB2008.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

fairness; TU-game; Myerson value; communication structure; marginal vector

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

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