A simple bargaining procedure for the Myerson value

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2012-0006zbMATH Open1278.91081OpenAlexW2094045559MaRDI QIDQ2867523FDOQ2867523

Authors: Noemí Navarro, Andres Perea 

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://gredi.recherche.usherbrooke.ca/wpapers/GREDI-1029.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

networksbargainingcooperationMyerson value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games on graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C57) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cited In (1)

• Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games

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