A simple bargaining procedure for the Myerson value

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2012-0006MaRDI QIDQ2867523zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Noemí Navarro, Andres Perea

Publication date 19 December 2013

Published in The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://gredi.recherche.usherbrooke.ca/wpapers/GREDI-1029.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

networksbargainingcooperationMyerson value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games on graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C57) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cites work

• A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division
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Cited in

(1)

• Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games

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