A value with incomplete communication

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0641zbMath0915.90281OpenAlexW2098937137MaRDI QIDQ1279616

Gérard Hamiache

Publication date: 16 February 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0641

zbMATH Keywords

consistencynonnegative matrixShapley valuevaluePerron-Frobenius theoremMyerson valuelimited communicationassociated game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cites Work

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