Coalition formation under limited communication
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Publication:1194262
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90046-UzbMATH Open0762.90095MaRDI QIDQ1194262FDOQ1194262
Authors: Edward C. Rosenthal 
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
coalition formationbounded rationalitycommunication gamerestricted communicationnonempty coresinduced communications networks
Cites Work
- A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
- The assignment game. I: The core
- On the core of linear production games
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
- The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
- Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity
- Values of Graph-Restricted Games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation
- Communication and its cost in graph-restricted games
Cited In (10)
- Bargaining power in communication networks
- Stochastic Communication and Coalition Formation
- Coalitions with limited coordination
- An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable
- A value with incomplete communication
- How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication
- Forming Plurality at Minimum Cost
- How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation
- Coalition formation processes with belief revision among bounded-rational self-interested agents
- Restricted Coalition Formation
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