Coalition formation under limited communication
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Publication:1194262
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90046-UzbMath0762.90095MaRDI QIDQ1194262
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
bounded rationality; coalition formation; communication game; restricted communication; nonempty cores; induced communications networks
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Bargaining power in communication networks, An incomplete cooperation structure for a voting game can be strategically stable, A value with incomplete communication
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