Conference structures and fair allocation rules
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Cites work
- A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
- On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
- Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility
- Two-person bargaining: An experimental test of the Nash axioms
- Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Potential approach and characterizations of a Shapley value in multi-choice games
- Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
- Non-binding agreements and fairness in commons dilemma games
- Transversality of the Shapley value
- Potential, value, and coalition formation
- The consistent value of fuzzy games
- Equivalence theorem, consistency and axiomatizations of a multi-choice value
- Conference structures and consistency
- Allocation rules for hypergraph communication situations
- Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach
- Coalition formation under limited communication
- The Shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints
- Potentials in cooperative TU-games
- The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation
- A value with incomplete communication
- Consistent restricted Shapley values
- The Banzhaf power index on convex geometries
- Values of games with probabilistic graphs
- Conservation of energy in value theory
- The core of the inductive limit of a direct system of economies with a communication structure
- A value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives
- Balanced contributions axiom in the solution of cooperative games
- On values for generalized characteristic functions
- An implementation of the Owen value.
- Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
- The degree value for games with communication structure
- Symmetry, mutual dependence, and the weighted Shapley values
- Graphs and (levels of) cooperation in games: two ways how to allocate the surplus
- Decomposition of solutions and the Shapley value
- The stochastic Shapley value for coalitional games with externalities
- Balanced externalities and the Shapley value
- The proportional Shapley value and applications
- The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
- Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value
- Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges
- The effects of excluding coalitions
- New characterizations of the Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values using the intracoalitional balanced contributions property
- Constitutions and groups
- On new characterizations of the Owen value
- Harsanyi power solution for games with restricted cooperation
- Games with nested constraints given by a level structure
- The balanced contributions property for symmetric players
- Weakly balanced contributions and solutions for cooperative games
- Network structures with hierarchy and communication
- The within groups and the between groups Myerson values
- The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions
- A-potential function and a non-cooperative foundation for the solidarity value
- Calculating direct and indirect contributions of players in cooperative games via the multi-linear extension
- Balanced contributions based on indirect claims and the Shapley value
- Sign symmetry vs symmetry: Young's characterization of the Shapley value revisited
- Games and cooperation indices
- Cooperation indices and coalitional value
- The Myerson value and superfluous supports in union stable systems
- The Myerson value for complete coalition structures
- Players indifferent to cooperate and characterizations of the Shapley value
- A probabilistic position value
- Potential maximizers and network formation
- Values and potential of games with cooperation structure
- The Myerson value for directed graph games
- Some properties for bisemivalues on bicooperative games
- The Shapley value for cooperative games with restricted worths
- The position value and the structures of graphs
- On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments
- Cooperative games with partial information
- Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution
- Sharing delay costs in stochastic scheduling problems with delays
- Weakly balanced contributions and the weighted Shapley values
- New axiomatizations of the Owen value
- A new Shapley value for games with fuzzy coalitions
- Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values
- Egalitarian allocation and players of certain type
- Values for level structures with polynomial-time algorithms, relevant coalition functions, and general considerations
- The average tree value for hypergraph games
- Assessment of the influence of features on a classification problem: an application to COVID-19 patients
- Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
- Priority relations and cooperation with multiple activity levels
- Uncertain production environment and communication structure
- The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration
- Characterization of a value for games under restricted cooperation
- Cooperative and axiomatic approaches to the knapsack allocation problem
- The nucleolus and inheritance of properties in communication situations
- Structural control in weighted voting games
- The equal collective gains value in cooperative games
- Allocation rules for cooperative games with restricted communication and a priori unions based on the Myerson value and the average tree solution
- The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility
- Sharing the surplus and proportional values
- Impacts of boycotts concerning the Shapley value and extensions
- Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value
- A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information
- Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies
- Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
- Second-order productivity, second-order payoffs, and the Shapley value
- Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations
- A value for communication situations with players having different bargaining abilities
- Recursive and bargaining values
- Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium
- The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
- On the Owen value and the property of balanced contributions within unions
- A fuzzy cooperative game theoretic approach for multinational water resource spatiotemporal allocation
- Necessary players, myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals
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