On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2020.09.002MaRDI QIDQ2021335zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andrés Salamanca

Publication date 26 April 2021

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.09.002

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesincentive compatibilityincomplete informationShapley valuetransferable utilityvirtual utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Review text

The author is concerned with the solution concept of value in transferable utility games with asymmetric information, and proposes a model in which contingent contracts are required to be incentive compatible, and thus utility might not be not fully transferable. Moreover, the model in which monetary transfers are modeled as additional sidepayments in a non-transferable utility game. The main result shows that Myerson's generalization of the Shapley value and the Salamanca extension of the Harsanyi value are interim utility equivalent in this new model.

Recommendations

• Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: an eloquent example
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 176277
• Cooperative strategic games
• Shapley value in a model of information transferal
• Cooperative games with incomplete information

Cites work

• A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
• An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution
• An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
• Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Cooperative games with incomplete information
• Cooperative games with incomplete information: some open problems
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910813 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910814 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3347963 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• Nontransferable Utility Games and Markets: Some Examples and the Harsanyi Solution
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
• The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
• Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information
• Two-person bargaining with verifiable information
• Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: an eloquent example
• Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts
• Values of games without side payments
• Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information

Cited in

(2)

• A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information
• Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games

This page was built for publication: On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2021335)