Two-person bargaining with verifiable information

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.07.001zbMath1099.91017MaRDI QIDQ1886755

Enrico Minelli, Geoffroy de Clippel

Publication date: 19 November 2004

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.07.001

zbMATH Keywords

Bargaining; Verifiable information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A05: 2-person games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values, Selling with evidence, A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types, Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information, Interim third-party selection in bargaining, The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information, COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS, SOLUTION CONCEPT FOR A TWO PERSON BARGAINING PROBLEM WITH UNKNOWN PARAMETERS

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