Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts

DOI10.2307/1911108zbMATH Open0436.90115OpenAlexW2015835078MaRDI QIDQ3877447FDOQ3877447

Authors: Alvin E. Roth 

Publication date: 1980

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/eeb90dc916d7e89c54ba701d9e9dd0857e0bbb13

zbMATH Keywords

solution conceptsrational behaviorgames without sidepaymentslambda-transfer valueexamples of gamesstable bargaining solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cited In (17)

• Cooperative games with incomplete information
• Values for two-stage games: Another view of the Shapley axioms
• Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value
• The compromise value for NTU-games
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• A procedural egalitarian solution for NTU-games
• Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets
• When do market games have transferable utility?
• On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments
• A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information
• Reinterpreting the kernel
• The equal split-off set for NTU-games
• A non-cooperative bargaining procedure generalising the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution to NTU games
• Bargaining in cooperative games
• Values for Markovian coalition processes
• On bargaining position descriptions in non-transferable utility games. Symmetry versus asymmetry
• The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation

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