Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets
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Publication:734048
DOI10.1007/S00355-008-0347-3zbMATH Open1183.91111OpenAlexW2122660630WikidataQ59900136 ScholiaQ59900136MaRDI QIDQ734048FDOQ734048
Elette Boyle, Federico Echenique
Publication date: 19 October 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79571/
Recommendations
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
- Procedurally fair and stable matching
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
- On randomized matching mechanisms
- The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts
Cited In (1)
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