Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0347-3zbMath1183.91111WikidataQ59900136 ScholiaQ59900136MaRDI QIDQ734048

Federico Echenique, Elette Boyle

Publication date: 19 October 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79571/

zbMATH Keywords

sequential bargaining; coalitional monotonicity; NTU Shapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91B68: Matching models

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