Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3827624 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- On randomized matching mechanisms
- Procedurally fair and stable matching
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Restabilizing matching markets at senior level
- The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems
- Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets
- Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts
- ``Timing is everything and marital bliss
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