Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2482665
DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0037-2zbMath1143.91041OpenAlexW2010725720MaRDI QIDQ2482665
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0037-2
Related Items (31)
Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries ⋮ Random path to stability in a decentralized market with contracts ⋮ Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market ⋮ Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance ⋮ Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance ⋮ A one-sided many-to-many matching problem ⋮ Analysis of stochastic matching markets ⋮ Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints ⋮ Stochastic stability for roommate markets ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games ⋮ A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems ⋮ Constitutions and groups ⋮ Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples ⋮ Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences ⋮ Paths to stability for overlapping group structures ⋮ Stochastic stability in assignment problems ⋮ Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents ⋮ Stability and convergence in matching processes for shared mobility systems ⋮ A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' ⋮ Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem ⋮ Minimal envy and popular matchings ⋮ Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty ⋮ Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems ⋮ The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems ⋮ Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem ⋮ Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets ⋮ Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab ⋮ Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains ⋮ Paths to stable allocations ⋮ MATCHING WITH COUPLES: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY SURVEY
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- Strongly stable networks
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
This page was built for publication: Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
