Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2482665
DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0037-2zbMATH Open1143.91041OpenAlexW2010725720MaRDI QIDQ2482665FDOQ2482665
Authors: Fuhito Kojima, M. Utku Ünver 
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0037-2
Recommendations
Cites Work
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- Strongly stable networks
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
Cited In (38)
- Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
- Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
- Minimal envy and popular matchings
- Stochastic stability in assignment problems
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- A one-sided many-to-many matching problem
- Constitutions and groups
- Deferred acceptance with compensation chains
- Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets
- Paths to stable allocations
- Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
- Random paths to \(P\)-stability in the roommate problem
- The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems
- Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents
- Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
- Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries
- Paths to stability for overlapping group structures
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
- Random path to stability in a decentralized market with contracts
- Core stability and core selection in a decentralized labor matching market
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints
- Paths to stability in the assignment problem
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
- Stability and convergence in matching processes for shared mobility systems
- Stochastic stability for roommate markets
- Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
- Choice function-based two-sided markets: stability, lattice property, path independence and algorithms
- A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
- Subjective homophily and the fixtures problem
- Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets
- A characterization of absorbing sets in coalition formation games
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Analysis of stochastic matching markets
- Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
- Matching with couples: a multidisciplinary survey
- Restricted complementarity and paths to stability in matching with couples
This page was built for publication: Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2482665)
