Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
From MaRDI portal
Publication:864893
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.002zbMath1153.91691OpenAlexW2145015113MaRDI QIDQ864893
Publication date: 13 February 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2004/60404.pdf
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