School choice with neighbors

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.12.001MaRDI QIDQ2425195zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Thomas Wiseman, Umut Mert Dur

Publication date 26 June 2019

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

market designmatching theoryschool choice problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Constrained school choice
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Family ties: school assignment with siblings
• School choice under partial fairness
• Outcome equivalence in school choice with reciprocal preferences

Cites work

• A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• Improving community cohesion in school choice via correlated-lottery implementation
• On cores and indivisibility
• Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
• Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
• Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples

Cited in

(19)

• School choice with vouchers
• School choice with hybrid schedules
• Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
• Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
• Overlapping multiple object assignments
• Improving community cohesion in school choice via correlated-lottery implementation
• Controlled school choice with soft bounds and overlapping types
• On the choice of schools located outside the walkable neighbourhood of the household
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Family ties: school assignment with siblings
• On the operation of multiple matching markets
• Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
• A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem
• School choice with farsighted students
• Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?
• Sticky matching in school choice
• Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism
• Constrained school choice
• Centralized allocation in multiple markets

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