School choice with neighbors
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Publication:2425195
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Improving Community Cohesion in School Choice via Correlated-Lottery Implementation
- On cores and indivisibility
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
- Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
- Stable matchings and preferences of couples
Cited in
(17)- On the choice of schools located outside the walkable neighbourhood of the household
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
- School Choice with Consent*
- School choice with hybrid schedules
- Centralized allocation in multiple markets
- Sticky matching in school choice
- Constrained school choice
- A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem
- Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
- Controlled school choice with soft bounds and overlapping types
- Overlapping multiple object assignments
- Family ties: school assignment with siblings
- School choice with vouchers
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences
- School choice with farsighted students
- Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: when is there a trade-off?
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