School choice with neighbors

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.12.001zbMath1417.91381OpenAlexW2925197044WikidataQ128175233 ScholiaQ128175233MaRDI QIDQ2425195

Thomas Wiseman, Umut Mert Dur

Publication date: 26 June 2019

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

market designmatching theoryschool choice problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (6)

Overlapping multiple object assignments ⋮ Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities ⋮ Centralized allocation in multiple markets ⋮ Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences ⋮ Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach ⋮ On the operation of multiple matching markets

Cites Work

• Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• Stable matchings and preferences of couples
• On cores and indivisibility
• A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
• Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
• Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities
• Improving Community Cohesion in School Choice via Correlated-Lottery Implementation
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Unnamed Item

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