Family ties: school assignment with siblings

DOI10.3982/TE4086MaRDI QIDQ5087339zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Umut Mert Dur, Thayer Morrill, William Phan

Publication date 11 July 2022

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te4086

zbMATH Keywords

matching theorymatching with contractsschool choice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Constrained school choice
• School choice with neighbors
• School Choice with Consent^*
• Making just school assignments
• The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach

Cited in

(7)

• School choice with hybrid schedules
• School choice with neighbors
• On the choice of schools located outside the walkable neighbourhood of the household
• Capacity design in school choice
• Partitionable choice functions and stability
• Stability and substitutability in multi-period matching markets
• Robust group manipulation with indifferences

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