Robust group manipulation with indifferences

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2025.08.001MaRDI QIDQ6930628zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Steven Kivinen

Publication date 12 September 2025

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2025.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

matchingvotingrobust group strategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
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