Robust group strategy-proofness

DOI10.3982/TE4229MaRDI QIDQ3390545zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steven Kivinen, Norovsambuu Tumennasan

Publication date 24 March 2022

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te4229

zbMATH Keywords

deferred acceptancetop trading cyclesfree disposalacyclic prioritiesgroup replacement monotonicityminimum demand rulerobust group strategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Public goods (91B18)

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Cited in

(3)

• On the manipulability of equitable voting rules
• Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: the role of tie-breaking rules
• Robust group manipulation with indifferences

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