On the manipulability of equitable voting rules

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.06.005MaRDI QIDQ6176739zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Steven Kivinen

Publication date 23 August 2023

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2023.06.005

zbMATH Keywords

equitable voting rulesmajority votingrobust group strategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives
• Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
• Equitable Voting Rules
• Robustness against inefficient manipulation
• Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems

Cites work

• A Characterization of Weighted Voting
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• An extreme point characterization of random strategy-proof social choice functions: the two alternative case
• Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
• Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach
• Complete simple games
• Equitable Voting Rules
• Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
• Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
• Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
• Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
• On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives
• Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation
• Robust group strategy-proofness
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Transitive permutation groups and equipotent voting rules
• Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
• Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
• Voting in corporations
• Weighted voting, multicameral representation, and power

Cited in

(9)

• Nonmanipulable voting schemes when participants' interests are partially decomposable
• Equitable agendas: Agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions
• Voting rules that are unbiased but not transitive-symmetric
• Equitable Voting Rules
• Equitable, neutral, and efficient voting rules
• Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: the role of tie-breaking rules
• Sequential unanimity voting rules for binary social choice
• Robust group manipulation with indifferences
• Resolute and symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems

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