Voting in corporations

DOI10.3982/TE3668MaRDI QIDQ5164450zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alan D. Miller

Publication date 11 November 2021

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te3668

zbMATH Keywords

axiomsdifference rulesmerger consistencyone share-one voteratio rulesreallocation invarianceshare majority ruleshareholder voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Shareholders' choice
• Shareholder voting
• Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets
• Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
• A characterization of majority voting rules with quorums

Cited in

(7)

• Individual rationality and voting in cooperative production
• Shareholders' choice
• Shareholder voting
• Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules*
• One Cow, One Vote?
• CHR for social responsibility
• On the manipulability of equitable voting rules

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