Shareholders' choice

DOI10.1007/BF01237187zbMATH Open0992.91025OpenAlexW4250491659MaRDI QIDQ1601985FDOQ1601985

Authors: Petra M. W. A. Geraats, Hans Haller 

Publication date: 1 July 2002

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01237187

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zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic resultsshareholder votingmedian-voter approachproduction decisionsshareholder disagreement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Competitive Stock Markets
• The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm
• Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
• Profit maximization mitigates competition
• On Shareholder Unanimity in Large Stock Market Economies
• The foundation of the theory of monopolistic competition revisited
• Perfect competition, the profit criterion, and the organization of economic activity
• Collective Decision Mechanisms and Efficient Stock Market Allocations: Existence of a Participation Equilibrium
• Asymptotic shareholder unanimity with exogenous noise
• Equilibrium in a Stock Market Economy with Shareholder Voting
• Expected utility maximization and capital budgeting subgoals
• Corporate Production and Shareholder Cooperation under Uncertainty

Cited In (12)

• A geometric study of shareholders' voting in incomplete markets: Multivariate median and mean shareholder theorems
• Employee stock ownership and diversification
• Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets
• Production externalities: internalization by voting
• Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
• Shareholder information and partial tender offers
• Voting in corporations
• One Share - One Vote: the Theory*
• One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence
• Say Pays! Shareholder Voice and Firm Performance*
• Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules*
• Shareholder voting

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