Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules*

DOI10.1093/ROF/RFN026MaRDI QIDQ3395694zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ernst Maug, Kristian Rydqvist

Publication date 13 September 2009

Published in Review of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/9f113acf069ccfd7479df35f57651a07540eb82a

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Shareholders' choice
• Voting in corporations
• Shareholder voting
• Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the Dominant Shareholder
• Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals

Cited in

(1)

• Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games

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