Production externalities: internalization by voting
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Publication:2376379
DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0697-zzbMath1268.91093MaRDI QIDQ2376379
Publication date: 21 June 2013
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09ieq060086/resources/externalityrr.pdf
majority voting; general equilibrium; internalization; production externalities; perfectly competitive markets; shareholder governance stakeholder democracy
91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm
Related Items
Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition, On the regularity of smooth production economies with externalities: competitive equilibrium à la Nash
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