Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies
DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0585-3zbMath1248.91055MaRDI QIDQ447527
Publication date: 4 September 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17677/1/MPRA_paper_17677.pdf
equilibrium; ownership structure; firm's objective; profit maximizing production plan; sequences of economies
91B52: Special types of economic equilibria
90B30: Production models
90C33: Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming)
91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm
49J45: Methods involving semicontinuity and convergence; relaxation
91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)
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Cites Work
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