Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies
equilibriumfirm's objectiveownership structureprofit maximizing production plansequences of economies
Methods involving semicontinuity and convergence; relaxation (49J45) Production models (90B30) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
With Hart's classical result [\textit{O. D. Hart}, Econometrica 47, 1057--1083 (1979; Zbl 0418.90008)] in the background, the main point of this paper is, to give a frame (a suitable topology on the space of production economies) and conditions (esp. for ownership structures) such that the behavior of sequences of large economies and suitable limit economies can be considered. It is shown, that Hart's assumption ``all agents are typical is very restrictive and a new proof of his result is given without the mentioned condition. From this some general convergence theorems are proved containing conditions, such that (e.g.) in the limit economy \(E\) there is a profit maximizing production plan \(y\) (at prices \(p\), where \(p\) is a unique equilibrium price associated with \(y\) in \(E\)).
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