Randomization and the limit points of monopolistic competition
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Publication:1330865
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)90006-XzbMath0821.90012OpenAlexW2080705200MaRDI QIDQ1330865
Publication date: 10 August 1994
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90006-x
monopolistic competitioncompetitive equilibrialimits of Nash-Cournot equilibriamultiple Walrasian equilibriasequence of replica economies
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