Walrasian equilibria as limits of noncooperative equilibria. II: Pure strategies
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Publication:585069
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90099-6zbMATH Open0524.90018OpenAlexW2084725583MaRDI QIDQ585069FDOQ585069
Authors: William Novshek, Hugo F. Sonnenschein
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90099-6
approximating finite economieslimit economynonconvex production setsnoncooperative Cournot equilibriaWalrasian equilibria
Cites Work
Cited In (12)
- Walrasian and Marshallian stability
- Industry dynamics: foundations for models with an infinite number of firms
- The approximation of competitive equilibria by Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in large markets
- Walrasian equilibria as limits of noncooperative equilibria. I: Mixed strategies
- Asymptotic equivalence between Cournot-Nash and Walras equilibria in exchange economies with atoms and an atomless part
- Solution differentiability for oligopolistic network equilibria
- Randomization and the limit points of monopolistic competition
- Strategic behavior in non-atomic games
- Indeterminacy of Cournot-Walras equilibrium with incomplete markets
- Perfectly competitive markets as the limits of Cournot markets
- Stable manifold market sequences
- The efficiency of monopolistically competitive equilibria in large economies: Commodity differentiation with Gross substitutes
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