Solution differentiability for oligopolistic network equilibria
DOI10.1016/0167-6377(90)90060-IzbMath0715.90033OpenAlexW1990555703MaRDI QIDQ751976
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(90)90060-i
nonlinear complementarityparametric solutionsDifferential sensitivity resultsoligopolistic network equilibriumsolution differentiability
Sensitivity, stability, parametric optimization (90C31) Fréchet and Gateaux differentiability in optimization (49J50) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
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