The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
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Publication:4074612
DOI10.2307/1911385zbMath0314.90013OpenAlexW2048923988MaRDI QIDQ4074612
Andrew Postlewaite, Donald John Roberts
Publication date: 1976
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911385
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