Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078983 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3095897 (Why is no real title available?)
- A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
- Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Incentive compatibility and competitive allocations
- Marriage, honesty, and stability
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
Cited in
(48)- Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains
- Piecewise Linear Incentive Schemes
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
- On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects
- Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism
- A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
- Making just school assignments
- The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets
- Efficient lottery design
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts
- Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem
- The losses from integration in matching markets can be large
- Assignment problems with complementarities
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
- Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful
- Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach
- Matching in the large: an experimental study
- The object allocation problem with random priorities
- Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
- An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Constrained random matching
- Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand
- An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Reallocation with priorities
- Strategy-proofness in the large
- Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
- A note on ex-ante stable lotteries
- A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
- Assigning agents to a line
- On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems
- Stability in large matching markets with complementarities
- Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems
- Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities
- When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free?
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms
- Stable matching in large economies
- Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
- Tight social welfare approximation of probabilistic serial
- Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment
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