Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
From MaRDI portal
Publication:848608
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2009.09.002zbMath1202.91061OpenAlexW2010264963MaRDI QIDQ848608
Publication date: 4 March 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.09.002
probabilistic serial mechanismrandom serial dictatorshiprandom assignmentordinal efficiencyexact strategy-proofness in large markets
Related Items
Fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof object allocation mechanisms ⋮ Efficient lottery design ⋮ Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ The welfare effects of pre-arrangements in matching markets ⋮ Assignment problems with complementarities ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Probabilistic assignment: an extension approach ⋮ Constrained random matching ⋮ The object allocation problem with random priorities ⋮ Matching in the large: an experimental study ⋮ Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach ⋮ Stability in Large Matching Markets with Complementarities ⋮ Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains ⋮ Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Strategy-proof stochastic assignment ⋮ Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems ⋮ Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation ⋮ On wastefulness of random assignments in discrete allocation problems ⋮ Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model ⋮ Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment ⋮ A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain ⋮ Reallocation with priorities ⋮ Efficient resource allocation under multi-unit demand ⋮ Welfare theorems for random assignments with priorities ⋮ The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences ⋮ An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Assigning agents to a line ⋮ When is the probabilistic serial assignment uniquely efficient and envy-free? ⋮ Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem ⋮ Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects ⋮ The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments ⋮ A note on ex-ante stable lotteries ⋮ Making just school assignments ⋮ Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful ⋮ Stable Matching in Large Economies ⋮ Random matching under priorities: stability and no envy concepts ⋮ The losses from integration in matching markets can be large ⋮ Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem ⋮ Tight social welfare approximation of probabilistic serial ⋮ Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- A constructive proof of the ordinal efficiency welfare theorem
- Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Incentive compatibility and competitive allocations
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
- Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
