Making just school assignments
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Publication:2516227
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.004zbMath1318.91147OpenAlexW253582333WikidataQ57436965 ScholiaQ57436965MaRDI QIDQ2516227
Publication date: 12 August 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.004
Related Items (13)
Trading probabilities along cycles ⋮ Competitive equilibria in school assignment ⋮ New axioms for deferred acceptance ⋮ Essentially stable matchings ⋮ Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments ⋮ When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? ⋮ New axioms for top trading cycles ⋮ Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities ⋮ On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model ⋮ Fair student placement ⋮ Two simple variations of top trading cycles ⋮ New axioms for immediate acceptance ⋮ Sticky matching in school choice
Cites Work
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- House allocation with existing tenants
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- School Choice with Consent*
- Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Unnamed Item
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