Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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Publication:4530990
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
- Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
- Local vs. global strategy-proofness: a new equivalence result for ordinal mechanisms
- Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
- A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Strategyproof allocation mechanisms with endowments and M-convex distributional constraints
- Strategy-proof allocation with outside option
- Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
- Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
- Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems
- On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Matching with restricted trade
- Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful?
- The marriage problem with interdependent preferences
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
- Competitive equilibria in school assignment
- Efficient mixtures of priority rules for assigning objects
- New axioms for top trading cycles
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Strategyproof mechanism for two-sided matching with resource allocation
- Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
- On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model
- Strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms for house allocation
- Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- On two mechanisms in job rotation problems
- Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
- A task-allocation problem
- Centralized allocation in multiple markets
- Random assignments of bundles
- Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
- The core of school choice problems
- Top trading cycles
- Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- Strategy-proof coalition formation
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
- Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Trading probabilities along cycles
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
- Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints
- Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem
- Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
- Making just school assignments
- Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- Stability of an allocation of objects
- School choice: an experimental study
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures
- Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
- Obviously strategy-proof implementation of assignment rules: a new characterization
- Random serial dictatorship: the one and only
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange
- Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets
- Corrigendum to ``Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
- Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
- A market design approach to job rotation
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
- Exchange in a general market with indivisible goods
- Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
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