Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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Publication:4530990
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00166zbMATH Open1023.91019OpenAlexW2149731240MaRDI QIDQ4530990FDOQ4530990
Authors: Szilvia Pápai 
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00166
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Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)
- Centralized allocation in multiple markets
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- Strategy-proof coalition formation
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Trading probabilities along cycles
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
- Making just school assignments
- Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
- School choice: an experimental study
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Corrigendum to ``Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
- Consistent house allocation
- Efficient priority rules
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
- Non-bossiness
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- House allocation with transfers
- Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
- Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness
- Efficient assignment respecting priorities
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
- Automated reasoning in social choice theory: some remarks
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
- An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Constrained school choice
- Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
- Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
- Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
- Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
- Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
- Random assignment under weak preferences
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
- On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable
- When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- New axioms for top trading cycles
- The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
- Competitive equilibria in school assignment
- Two simple variations of top trading cycles
- Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only
- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- The core of school choice problems
- Top trading cycles
- Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
- Random assignments of bundles
- Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
- Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
- Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
- Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
- Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
- A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem
- Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
- Stability of an allocation of objects
- A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures
- Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
- Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
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