Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange

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Centralized allocation in multiple markets
Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
Strategy-proof coalition formation
On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
Trading probabilities along cycles
A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
Pairwise kidney exchange
Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
Decomposing random mechanisms
Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
Making just school assignments
Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: characterizations and an affirmative action application
School choice: an experimental study
A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities
Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
Equivalence theorem in matching with contracts
Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
Corrigendum to ``Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences
Consistent house allocation
Efficient priority rules
Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
Non-bossiness
Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
Consistency in house allocation problems
House allocation with transfers
Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
Efficient assignment with interdependent values
Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness
Efficient assignment respecting priorities
Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
Automated reasoning in social choice theory: some remarks
Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
Efficient and fair assignment mechanisms are strongly group manipulable
House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
Constrained school choice
Strategy-proof social choice with exogenous indifference classes
Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?
Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
Welfare and stability in senior matching markets
Random assignment under weak preferences
Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
On the consistency of deferred acceptance when priorities are acceptant substitutable
When are efficient and fair assignment mechanisms group strategy-proof?
An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
New axioms for top trading cycles
The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
Competitive equilibria in school assignment
Two simple variations of top trading cycles
Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
On the operation of multiple matching markets
Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only
Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
The core of school choice problems
Top trading cycles
Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
Random assignments of bundles
Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler
Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence
Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints
Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses
A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem
Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
Stability of an allocation of objects
A unified approach to strategy-proofness of the deferred-acceptance rule and the top-trading cycles rule
Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures
Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model
Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange

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