Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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Publication:4530990
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00166zbMath1023.91019OpenAlexW2149731240MaRDI QIDQ4530990
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00166
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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