Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
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Publication:6565774
DOI10.3982/TE5471MaRDI QIDQ6565774FDOQ6565774
Authors: Özgün Ekici 
Publication date: 2 July 2024
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
- Bilateral Trading Processes, Pairwise Optimally, and Pareto Optimality
- On cores and indivisibility
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
- A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
- Pairwise, t-Wise, and Pareto Optimalities
- An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
Cited In (2)
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