Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects

DOI10.3982/TE5471MaRDI QIDQ6565774zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Özgün Ekici

Publication date 2 July 2024

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-prooftop trading cyclesindivisible objectindividually rationalpair efficient

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

• A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
• A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
• An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
• An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
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• Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
• House allocation with existing tenants
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
• On cores and indivisibility
• Pairwise, t-Wise, and Pareto Optimalities
• Queue allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(2)

• Top trading cycles
• Characterization of top trading cycles with single-dipped preferences

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