Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
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Publication:756630
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(82)90003-9zbMath0722.90009OpenAlexW2017097737MaRDI QIDQ756630
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(82)90003-9
Trade models (91B60) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
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