Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
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Publication:776969
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.05.003zbMATH Open1437.91232OpenAlexW3026621665MaRDI QIDQ776969FDOQ776969
Publication date: 13 July 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.003
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Cites Work
- On cores and indivisibility
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- House allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Kidney Exchange
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result
- Dynamic kidney exchange
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
Cited In (6)
- The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with existing tenants
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
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