Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.003zbMath1437.91232OpenAlexW3026621665MaRDI QIDQ776969

Özgün Ekici

Publication date: 13 July 2020

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.003

zbMATH Keywords

house allocationhousing marketequivalence of mechanismshouse allocation with existing tenants

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked

Cites Work

• Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
• Pairwise kidney exchange
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• House allocation with existing tenants
• On cores and indivisibility
• House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
• Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
• A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
• Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result
• Kidney Exchange
• Dynamic Kidney Exchange
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange

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