House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2387316
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.008zbMath1146.91331OpenAlexW2181027397MaRDI QIDQ2387316
Publication date: 2 September 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.008
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14) Matching models (91B68)
Related Items (24)
House-swapping with divorcing and engaged pairs ⋮ Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations ⋮ The crawler: three equivalence results for object (re)allocation problems when preferences are single-peaked ⋮ The relationship between top trading cycles mechanism and top trading cycles and chains mechanism ⋮ Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities ⋮ Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources ⋮ Reallocation with priorities ⋮ On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley-Scarf model ⋮ Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects ⋮ Swap-flexibility in the assignment of houses ⋮ Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies ⋮ House exchange and residential segregation in networks ⋮ Kidney exchange: an egalitarian mechanism ⋮ Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization ⋮ The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments ⋮ Computing the Deficiency of Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses ⋮ Random assignment under weak preferences ⋮ Influence in private-goods allocation ⋮ Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants ⋮ Pairwise kidney exchange
Cites Work
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- House allocation with existing tenants
- On cores and indivisibility
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- House allocation with transfers
This page was built for publication: House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
