Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems

DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0136-3zbMath1211.91179OpenAlexW2047069977MaRDI QIDQ532646

Onur Kesten

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0136-3

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessindivisible goodsresource monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (12)

Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence ⋮ Consistent house allocation ⋮ Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources ⋮ Endogenous budget constraints in the assignment game ⋮ Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents ⋮ Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange ⋮ On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization ⋮ Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects ⋮ Efficient priority rules ⋮ Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities

Cites Work

• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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