Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
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Publication:532646
DOI10.1007/S00182-008-0136-3zbMATH Open1211.91179OpenAlexW2047069977MaRDI QIDQ532646FDOQ532646
Authors: Onur Kesten 
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0136-3
Recommendations
Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
Cited In (19)
- Pareto-optimal matching allocation mechanisms for boundedly rational agents
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- A characterization of the top trading cycles mechanism for the school choice problem
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
- Pareto-optimal assignments by hierarchical exchange
- Corrigendum to ``Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Consistent house allocation
- Efficient priority rules
- Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Endogenous budget constraints in the assignment game
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
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