Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects

DOI10.1007/S00199-017-1049-9MaRDI QIDQ722621zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kazuhiko Hashimoto

Publication date 27 July 2018

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1049-9

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessidentical preferences lower boundPareto-efficiencytop trading cycle rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
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• Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
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• Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems

Cites work

• Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
• Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
• Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Consistent house allocation
• Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
• Efficient priority rules
• House allocation with existing tenants
• House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
• Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods
• Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
• Non-bossiness
• On cores and indivisibility
• On monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods
• Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
• Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods

Cited in

(10)

• Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems
• Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
• Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
• Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: the role of tie-breaking rules
• A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
• Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods
• Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
• The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
• The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods

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