Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
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Publication:2447169
DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0774-yzbMath1307.91137MaRDI QIDQ2447169
Publication date: 24 April 2014
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0774-y
consistency; strategy-proofness; group strategy-proofness; reallocation-proofness; consistent hierarchical exchange rules; hierarchical exchange rules
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
91B68: Matching models
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