Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem (Q2249580)

The present paper investigates the implications of egalitarian equivalence \textit{E. A. Pazner} and \textit{D. Schmeidler} in [``Egalitarian equivalent allocations: a new concept of equity'', Q. J. Econ 92, 671--687 (1978)] together with queue efficiency and strategy proofness in the context of queueing problems. The authors completely characterize the class of mechanisms satisfying the three requirements. Though there is no mechanism in this class satisfying budget balance, feasible mechanisms exist and we characterize the set of all such mechanisms. They also show that it is impossible to find a mechanism satisfying queue efficiency, egalitarian equivalence, and a stronger notion of strategy proofness called weak group strategy proofness. In addition, it is shown that generically there is no mechanism satisfying both egalitarian equivalence and no-envy.