The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
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Cites work
- Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- On cores and indivisibility
- On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Strategy-proof assignment on the full preference domain
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Strong Core and Competitive Equilibria of an Exchange Market with Indivisible Goods
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(41)- Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
- Matching with single-peaked preferences
- Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation
- Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores revisited
- Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
- Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
- A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties
- On the integration of Shapley-Scarf markets
- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home?
- Mechanisms for trading durable goods
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- An impossibility result for housing markets with fractional endowments
- Algorithms for Pareto optimal exchange with bounded exchange cycles
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Two-sided matching with indifferences
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Multi resource allocation with partial preferences
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?
- Learning matters: reappraising object allocation rules when agents strategically investigate
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
- Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
- The top‐trading cycles and chains solution for kidney exchange with immunosuppressants
- Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
- Exchange of indivisible goods under matroid constraints
- Stability of an allocation of objects
- Some characterizations of generalized top trading cycles
- Top trading cycles
- Reallocation mechanisms under distributional constraints in the full preference domain
- Achieving the maximum size for exchange problems with dichotomous preferences
- Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies
- Non-bossiness
- Minimal enforceability and indirect domination relations in the Shapley-Scarf economy
- Non-manipulable house exchange under (minimum) equilibrium prices
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- Strategy-proofness and identical preferences lower bound in allocation problem of indivisible objects
- On the core of markets with co-ownerships and indivisibilities
- Obviously strategy-proof implementation for mixed-ownership object-allocation problems
- Arbiter assignment
- The strong core of housing markets with partial order preferences
- Influence in private-goods allocation
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