A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties
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Publication:2075459
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Cites work
- Depth-First Search and Linear Graph Algorithms
- Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: the top trading absorbing sets mechanisms
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Matching and chatting: an experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms
- On cores and indivisibility
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(7)- An efficient implementation of the equilibrium algorithm for housing markets with duplicate houses
- Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
- Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities
- Computing the Deficiency of Housing Markets with Duplicate Houses
- A capacitated house market model with tenant under weak preferences
- A Lattice Linear Predicate Parallel Algorithm for the Housing Market Problem
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
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