Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems
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Cites work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- House allocation with transfers
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
- Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- On cores and indivisibility
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- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
- Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
Cited in
(42)- Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
- Matching with single-peaked preferences
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- House allocation with transfers
- Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
- Pair-efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
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- Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: a short proof
- Group incentive compatibility in the housing market problem with weak preferences
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- Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
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- Top trading with fixed tie-breaking in markets with indivisible goods
- Cores and mechanisms in restricted housing markets
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- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
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- House exchange and residential segregation in networks
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- A new allocation rule for the housing market problem with ties
- Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
- The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation of objects
- Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation
- Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets
- On Houseswapping, the Strict Core, Segmentation, and Linear Programming
- Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
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