House allocation with transfers
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Cites work
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Cited in
(40)- Allocating group housing
- Sequential rules for house allocation with price restrictions
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices
- Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money
- No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
- House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents
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- Strategy-proofness, core, and sequential trade
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation
- Joint misrepresentation with bribes
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
- Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
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- Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
- Reallocation with priorities
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- Nonbossy mechanisms: mechanism design robust to secondary goals
- Title not available (Why is no real title available?)
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- Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants
- Solving house allocation problems with risk-averse agents
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- Consistent house allocation
- Endogenous budget constraints in the assignment game
- Efficient allocation of heterogeneous commodities with balanced transfers
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
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