Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types
- Bargaining over bets
- Efficient allocation with continuous quantities
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Efficiency in partnerships
- Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures
- Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
- Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders
- Pollution claim settlements under private information
- Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
- Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects
- Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
- Mechanism design for land acquisition
- Divide and compromise
- Reordering an existing queue
- A simple budget-balanced mechanism
- Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- Status quo bias in bargaining: an extension of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem with an application to the Coase theorem.
- Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly
- Claim games for estate division problems
- An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games
- Buck-passing dumping in a garbage-dumping game
- Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
- Reorganizing a partnership efficiently
- Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments
- Dissolving a partnership securely
- A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
- The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
- A strategic approach to multiple estate division problems
- Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
- An equilibrium analysis of Knaster's fair division procedure
- Efficient dark markets
- A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
- Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control
- Balanced ranking mechanisms
- Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
- Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition
- Partnership dissolution and proprietary information
- Dissolving (in)effective partnerships
- Competitive bargaining equilibrium
- Banning bidders from all-pay auctions
- The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
- Efficient bilateral trade with statistically dependent beliefs
- Auctions with financial externalities
- (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- The river sharing problem with incomplete information
- Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms
- Mechanism design and intentions
- On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching
- Dissolving a partnership dynamically
- Partial ownership and cross-border mergers
- Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently
- Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem
- Asymmetric partnerships
- Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
- Value of the status quo and efficient partnership dissolution
- Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions
- Incentive compatible market design with applications
- Competitive equilibrium with indivisible goods and generic budgets
- Partnership dissolution: information and efficiency
- Long-term partnership for achieving efficient capacity allocation
- At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency
- Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships
- When queueing is better than push and shove
- Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders
- House allocation with transfers
- Optimal information structures in bilateral trade
- When Walras meets Vickrey
- Collusion enforcement in repeated first‐price auctions
- Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers
- A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
- Trade of a common value good
- Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers
- When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships
- Shuttle diplomacy
- Combinatorial reallocation mechanisms
- On the dissolution of three-party partnerships via a buy-sell mechanism
- Equitable rent division on a soft budget
- Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
- Withholding and damage in Bayesian trade mechanisms
- No trade
- On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
- Investment incentives in bilateral trading
- Partnerships of bidders with constant relative risk aversions
- The Texas shoot-out under Knightian uncertainty
- Two player bargaining model with outside subsidy
- Identification of incomplete information allocation-transfer games in monotone equilibrium
- AGV mechanism balances the budget with minimum total transfer variance
- Fair division with money and prices: bid \& sell versus divide \& choose
- Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents
- Ideal default for resolving disputes efficiently
- Non-cooperative solutions for estate division problems
- Dissolving a bilateral partnership
- Bilateral trading with contingent contracts
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