Dissolving a bilateral partnership

DOI10.1007/S00355-025-01640-8MaRDI QIDQ7324099zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Harshika Dalakoti

Publication date 2 September 2026

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-025-01640-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Cites work

• A model of reference-dependent preferences
• Auctions with loss‐averse bidders
• Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Dominant strategy implementation in a large population public goods game
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
• Loss Aversion and Inefficient Renegotiation
• Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions -- how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Robust trading mechanisms

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