Auctions with financial externalities
DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0119-1zbMATH Open1140.91033OpenAlexW3121614723MaRDI QIDQ2642869FDOQ2642869
Authors: Emiel Maasland, Sander Onderstal 
Publication date: 6 September 2007
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/541444/22.pdf
Recommendations
collusionBayesian Nash equilibriumfirst-price sealed-bid auctionreserve pricefinancial externalitiessecond-price sealed-bid auctionweakly separating Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)
Cites Work
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Auction Design
- Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
- Auctions with cross-shareholdings
- Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings
- Auctions with financial externalities
- Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction
- Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
- Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
- Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
- Determining damages from the operation of bidding rings: an analysis of the post-auction ``knockout sale.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (17)
- Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
- Contests with rank-order spillovers
- Auctions with noncompetitive sales
- Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
- The loser's bliss in auctions with price externality
- Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings
- High bids and broke winners
- Charity auctions for the happy few
- An auction with positive externality and possible application to overtime rules in football, soccer, and chess
- Participation and exclusion in auctions
- Auctions with financial externalities
- Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence
- Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions
- Auctioning big facilities under financial constraints
- Matching auction with winner's curse and imperfect financial markets
- Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities
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