High bids and broke winners
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Publication:5952426
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2715zbMath0998.91018MaRDI QIDQ5952426
Publication date: 24 November 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
- Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
- Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
- The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
- A model of auction contracts with liquidated damages
- Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders
- Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly?
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
- Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance
