Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly?

DOI10.1287/mnsc.49.1.71.12748zbMath1232.91328OpenAlexW2015294555MaRDI QIDQ3114828

Yuhong Fu, Michael H. Rothkopf, Ronald M. Harstad

Publication date: 19 February 2012

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.1.71.12748

zbMATH Keywords

auctionssubsidiesdisadvantaged competitors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Information policies in procurement auctions with heterogeneous suppliers ⋮ Competition for procurement shares ⋮ Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers ⋮ Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation ⋮ Premium auctions and risk preferences ⋮ High bids and broke winners

This page was built for publication: Is Subsidizing Inefficient Bidders Actually Costly?